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Article 8 of Directive 2009/128/EC (Sustainable Use
Directive) demands a risk assessment for human health
and the environment in order to apply different time
tables and inspection intervals in selected cases for the
inspection of pesticide application equipment (PAE) in
use or make exemptions from inspection within the
member states of EU 27. The experts of the SPISE
(Standardised Procedure for the Inspection of Spray-
ers in Europe) Technical Working Group agreed on
their meeting in March 2015 to use the Zürich-method-
ology as an appropriate instrument to implement the
demanded risk assessment in a harmonized manner
within the EU 27. The article explains the Zürich-meth-
odology, illustrates its requirements and demonstrates
the application of this method at the example of a risk
assessment in case of Germany. Furthermore, it shows
of what questions still have to be discussed in future by
the expert in order to come up with a common and har-
monized procedure being applicable for all member
states of EU 27.
Key words: Directive 2009/128/EC, Sustainable Use
Directive, Pesticide Application Equipment, Risk
assessment, Inspection of equipment in use,
Zürich-methodology
Zusammenfassung
Die Richtline 2009/128/EC (nachhaltige Verwendung
von Pestiziden) fordert in Artikel 8 eine Risikobewertung
mit Bezug zur menschlichen Gesundheit und zur Umwelt,
um mögliche Ausnahmen bei der Kontrollpflicht für in
Gebrauch befindliche Geräte umzusetzen. Diese Ausnah-
men können nur für bestimmte Gerätearten angewendet
werden und können zu alternativen Zeitplänen und Kon-
trollabständen oder auch insgesamt zum Wegfall der
Kontrollpflicht bei einigen Gerätearten führen. Auf dem
Treffen der SPISE (Standardised Procedure for the Inspec-
tion of Sprayers in Europe) Technical Working Group im
März 2015 einigten sich die Experten darauf, die Zürich-
Methode als ein geeignetes Instrument zur harmonisier-
ten Risikobewertung in allen EU 27 Mitgliedsstaaten für
diesen Fall heranzuziehen. Dieser Beitrag erklärt die
Methode, zeigt ihre Anforderungen auf und demonstriert
sie am Beispiel der in Gebrauch befindlichen Pflanzen-
schutzgeräte in Deutschland. Darüber hinaus wird aufge-
zeigt, welche Fragen zukünftig noch von den Experten
beantwortet werden müssen, um ein europaweit harmo-
nisiertes Verfahren anwenden zu können.
Stichwörter: Directive 2009/128/EC, Sustainable Use
Directive, Anwendungsgeräte für Pestizide, Kontrolle
von in Gebrauch befindlichen Geräten, Zürich-Methode




Article 8 (3) of Directive 2009/128/EC (Sustainable Use
Directive – SUD) demands a risk assessment for human
health and the environment in order to apply different
time tables and inspection intervals in selected cases for
the inspection of pesticide application equipment (PAE)
in use. These exemptions in regard to different time tables
and inspection intervals are concerning PAE
• not used for spraying pesticides,
• which are handheld application equipment,
• knapsack sprayers,
• or additional PAE that represent a very low scale of
use.
Furthermore, if operators are trained for the proper use
and about the specific risks linked to the application of
handheld PAE and knapsack sprayers, these groups of
PAE may be exempted from inspection.
A still unanswered question is how to exercise the men-
tioned risk assessment in a practical and harmonized
manner on European level. In this context the risk matrix
according to NOHL and THIEMECKE (1988), also known as
Zürich-methodology, seems to be an appropriate tool to
assess the risks related to the utilization of PAE in use.
The general idea and suitability of the Zürich-methodo-
logy in the context of an assessment of PAE in use was
already presented by GANZELMEIER (2012) during SPISE
IV Workshop hold in Lana (Italy). Based on this general
idea WEGENER (2015) improved this approach under con-
sideration of an equal treatment of all different kinds of
PAE and described the general procedure in detail. In
2014 this approach was discussed with several European
experts during SPISE V Workshop in Montpellier (France).
One result of the discussion was to run through the pro-
cedure using statistical material from practice in order to
judge about the practicability of this approach. Another
important result was that the suggested method to figure
out the probability of occurrence-levels needs to be devel-
oped further in order to be applicable for all member
states since their quantities of equipment within the dif-
ferent groups of PAE vary strongly from country to coun-
try. Aim of this paper is to derive a risk assessment based
on the Zürich-methodology at the example of available
statistics about PAE in use in Germany being applicable
for all member states of the EU. A first draft of the improved
approach was already presented and discussed in March
2015 during the SPISE Technical Working Group meeting
in Braunschweig (Germany). This paper contains the lat-
est status of the discussion and presents some further
suggestions for improvement of this method.
Material and Methods
The risk matrix according to NOHL and THIEMECKE (1988)
is a common method for technical risk assessment also
known as Zürich-methodology. It is applied for the assess-
ment of safety risks of aerial railways or even for the
assessment of risks arising from the operation of nuclear
power plants. A technical risk is the product of probabil-
ity of occurrence of a certain failure and the extent of the
subsequent damage. These two elements of a technical
risk can be presented in a matrix distinguished in differ-
ent qualitative classes (Fig. 1). Aim of the matrix is to
define how high a risk might be.
The advantage of the Zürich-methodology concerning
the risk assessment of PAE is that the risk assessment can
be reduced to those technical parameters which are the
focus of the inspection of PAE in use. This means that
parameters being fraught with risks could be eliminated
by inspection for that pesticide application equipment
being obliged to inspection.
In order to use this approach for the risk assessment of
PAE in use the extent of damage was discharged by a
qualitative analyses of equipment components being part
of the inspection (acc. EN 13790) and their impact in
case of technical disorder on human health and the envi-
ronment. Therefore, each category of PAE has to be
judged about the impact of their different components by
using qualitative measures. A first attempt was done by
GANZELMEIER (2012) and presented during SPISE IV
Workshop (Tab. 1). He used the following qualitative
measures and quantified them by using a point system:
++ = 20 points, + = 15 points, 0 = 10 points, – = 5 points
and -- = 0 points. Afterwards, he formed the sum of each
category and ordered the groups by size. In this way the
axis describing the probability of occurrence was dis-
charged within the risk matrix (cf., Fig. 1).
The probability of occurrence is normally figured out
by taking the number of incidents of each group of PAE
into account. Since there are no such statistics available
on a national level of all member states (SPISE, 2014)
this lack of information has to be solved by taking the
number of different PAE used in practice into account
since these numbers should be proportional to the fre-
quency of incidents. The numbers of PAE in use (Fig. 2)
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els (level 1 = 1,000 PAE, level 2 = 2,000 PAE, level
3 = 5,000 PAE, level 4 = 10,000 PAE, level 5 = 20,000
PAE, level 6 = 50,000 PAE). An unanswered question
during SPISE IV was how to define the risk tolerance line.
Therefore, WEGENER (2015) expanded the matrix by mul-
tiplying each category of PAE (1–8) with each probability
of occurrence level (1–6). Afterwards, in order to have an
equal treatment of all PAE considered, the legal exemp-
tions mentioned within article 8 (3) of the SUD concern-
ing the necessity of inspections were drawn into the
matrix (Fig. 2, green and red boxes). At the end the risk
tolerance was generally defined by taking into account
the highest acceptable risk which was calculated within
the green box (Fig. 2, purple box).
Fig. 3 shows the general risk matrix established based
on the aforementioned considerations. Within the red
zone one can find all cases within the matrix being either
above the risk tolerance level of 12 or being within the
group of PAE where inspection is mandatory due to the
legal statements of the SUD. The green zone represents
those cases which may be exempted from inspection if
Tab. 1. Different categories of Pesticide Application Equipment and the qualitative impact of their components on human
health and the environment: ++ = very high, + = high, 0 = average, – = low, -- = very low (GANZELMEIER, 2012)
Equipment components

















Power transmission parts ++ + 0 -- -- 0 + +
Pump + + + 0 0 0 + +
Agitation + + 0 -- – – ++ ++
Spray liquid tank ++ + + -- -- + ++ ++
Pipes and hoses + ++ ++ -- -- 0 ++ ++
Spray boom + 0 0 -- -- – + ++
Filter 0 0 0 – – 0 0 0
Nozzles ++ ++ + – – 0 ++ ++
Controls 0 0 0 – 0 0 + +
Regulation systems + 0 0 – – + ++ ++
Distribution/drift + 0 0 – 0 0 ++ ++
Cleaning ++ 0 0 – – 0 ++ ++
Blowers + – – – – – – –
Sum 205 165 150 45 60 125 215 230
Priority by sum 6 5 4 1 2 3 7 8
Fig. 2. Risk tolerance based on Sustainable Use Directive
(WEGENER, 2015).
1                ( 1´) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
2                ( 2´) 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
3                ( 5´) 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24
4                (10´) 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 32
5                (20´) 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40






























































































Risk Tolerance = 12
Fig. 3. Risk matrix for the need of inspection of different
categories of PAE (WEGENER, 2015).
1                 (1´) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
2                 (2´) 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
3                 (5´) 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24
4                 (10´) 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 32
5                 (20´) 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
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those cases where different time tables and inspection
intervals can be applied.
Within a discussion during SPISE Technical Working
Group meeting in Braunschweig (Germany) in March
2015 some more suggestions were made in order to
improve the methodology and to make it universal for all
member states. It was agreed
1. to consider within the matrix that the order of the PAE
categories is non-linear concerning the individual sum
of the calculated extend of damage (e.g. Tab. 1, last
line),
2. to have a linear scale for the probability of occurrence
levels, and
3. to find an appropriate method for scaling the probabil-
ity of occurrence levels being representative for all
member states within the EU.
Concerning the first point the methodological improve-
ment can be made by adopting the sum of each category
of PAE from Tab. 1 into the first line of the matrix, repre-
senting the first level of probability of occurrence. Then,
these figures can be multiplied within the matrix by the
number of levels considered in total.
The second and third point can be solved by relating
the country-specific number of PAE of each group to the
total area under cultivation for each country. This approach
considers differences between member states concerning
their individual structures of the agricultural sector
within the EU. It follows the hypothesis that a state with
a high amount of small scale farms having more PAE per
e.g. one million of hectares of agricultural used land has
a higher risk for incidents compared to a state with a lower
amount of PAE per one million of hectares. The definite
scale for the probability of occurrence levels and its linear
division can only be determined finally when all of the
statistical data-sets for EU 27 are collected.
Risk Assessment at the example of Germany
In order to apply the Zürich-methodology for the risk
assessment of PAE at the example of Germany an expert
survey was started during the period from December
2014 to March 2015. Thirteen experts from the Federal
Plant Protection Services (not considered were the City-
states of Bremen, Hamburg and Berlin) were asked to
provide statistical information (if available) or estima-
tions about the numbers of PAE in professional use within
the aforementioned eight categories (e.g. Fig. 3) con-
cerning their area of responsibility. Tab. 2 shows the
results of the expert survey as aggregated data-set for
Germany. Moreover, it shows the amount of machinery
for each category of PAE per one million hectares accord-
ing to the total area of cultivation in Germany in 2013 (=
16.7 million hectares, e.g. STATISTISCHES BUNDESAMT,
2014).
Results
Taking the numbers presented in Tab. 2 into account the
probability of occurrence levels can be aligned by the
highest number of PAE per one million hectares (in this
case 23,952). In order to have a linear scale the incre-
ment of the scale is considered to be 5,000 in this case.
All these figures and the above mentioned considerations
are incorporated in Fig. 4. The matrix includes the
non-linear correlation between the different groups of
PAE concerning the extent of damage by adopting the
sum of each category (e.g. Tab. 1, last line) within the
first probability of occurrence level. These figures are
multiplied by the different probability of occurrence lev-
els following within the next lines. The highest accept-
able risk being discharged by the number of knapsack


















PAE 220,000 400,000 5,000 13,500 32,000 172,000 30 8
PAE per m. ha 13,174 23,952 299 808 1,916 10,299 1.8 0.5
Fig. 4. Risk matrix for the need of inspection of different
categories of PAE at the example of Germany.
1              (5‘) 45 60 125 150 165 205 215 230
2              (10‘) 90 120 250 300 330 410 430 460
3              (15‘) 135 180 375 450 495 615 645 690
4              (20‘) 180 240 500 600 660 820 860 920
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ance line in this case.
Based on the described procedure and figures the pre-
sented risk assessment for the case of Germany would
allow different time tables and inspection intervals for
the PAE categories “Additional/low scale use”, “not used
for spraying” and “hand-operated” according to article 8
(3) of the SUD.
Discussion
The presented risk assessment can determine which type
of the relevant PAE has a low, a significant and a high risk
with regard to human health and the environment from
a technical point of view on a qualitative measure. It can-
not judge the risk which is coming from unprofessional
use of PAE by the operator or due to other not technical
circumstances. But, taking into account that the reason
for the risk assessment is the question of considering
exemptions from inspection, risks other than technical
ones cannot be the focus in this context.
The presented methodology takes those technical
parameters into account, which are components being
checked by inspection (e.g. WEGENER, 2015). This approach
limits the area of consideration concerning the risks to
that one which can be suppressed by a technical inspec-
tion. Furthermore, it puts the same criteria to all different
categories of PAE so that all of them are treated in an
equal way concerning the question if exemptions from
inspection are possible or not.
The risk assessment presented here is a qualitative one.
It is lacking in accuracy at different steps of the approach
due to subjective measures or due to a lack of informa-
tion which are not existent and could maybe only be
roughly estimated. But, the example of Germany demon-
strates that the presented Zürich-methodology is applica-
ble if Member States can provide (estimated) national
figures about the different groups of PAE in use. The
question is, if a more sophisticated approach would really
come up with another ranking of the PAE categories
within the extent of damage?
What is needed in any case is that an expert panel con-
firms the qualitative judgement made during the process
of the determination of the extent of the damage and that
they give a written statement about the specific evalua-
tion of each point which clearly informs about why and
how the estimations were made. Unfortunately, there are
no notations available justifying the assessment made by
GANZELMEIER (e.g. Tab. 1). Furthermore, there are two
options for the classification of the figures used for the
probability of occurrence-levels which have to be dis-
cussed by the experts. One possibility is to have a general
risk tolerance line being valid for all European member
states. This can be defined not until all numbers of differ-
ent categories of PAE for all member states are collected.
The country with the highest amount of either handheld
or knapsack sprayers per one million of hectares would
define the total number of probability of occurrence lev-
els within the matrix being necessary and also define the
general European risk tolerance line. Another option
would be to have country specific risk tolerance lines
being discharged at national levels as presented in this
study.
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